From Glen Brown:
Review of Precedents in Brief to ILSC,
March 3, 2015
“[The Illinois Supreme] Court has
rejected similar attempts to justify constitutional violations on the basis of
financial necessity”
“…The defendants' attempt to justify
the Act [Senate Bill 1] also is foreclosed by the fundamental principle that
the ‘[Illinois] General Assembly cannot enact legislation that conflicts with
specific provisions of the constitution, unless the constitution specifically
grants the legislature that authority.’ O'Brien v. White, 219 III. 2d
86, 100 (2006).
“In other words, the General
Assembly can have no implied power to do what the Constitution expressly
prohibits. Rather, ‘limitations written into the Constitution are restrictions
on legislative power.’ Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 75 III. 2d 208,
215 (1979).
“Put another way, ‘the constitution
is not regarded as a grant of powers to the legislature but is a limitation upon its
authority; the legislature may enact any legislation not expressly prohibited
by the constitution.’ People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass 'n v. State Bd. of
Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 525 (1990). Accordingly, an exercise of the
police power ‘must not conflict with the Constitution.’ City of Belleville
v. St. Clair Cnty. TPk. Co., 234 Ill. 428, 437 (1908).
“This Court's precedents make clear
that no crisis can give the political branches of government the power to
violate the Constitution. This principle has been applied specifically to
enforce constitutional prohibitions against diminishing compensation owed to
public servants, notwithstanding arguments based upon fiscal exigencies. See Jorgensen, 211 III. 2d at
316 (‘No principle of law permits us to suspend constitutional requirements for
economic reasons, no matter how compelling those reasons may seem’); People
ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago, 360 III. 25, 29 (1935) (‘Neither the
Legislature nor any executive or judicial officer may disregard the provisions
of the Constitution even in case of a great emergency’).
“As the appellate court explained in
People ex rel. Northrup v. City Council of City of Chicago, 308 Ill.
App. 284, 289 (1941), ‘an emergency cannot be created by the facts and used as
a means of construction of a constitutional provision which has made no
reference to any emergency by its terms.’
“As demonstrated by Lyle and Northrup,
this principle was consistently applied by Illinois courts even during the
Great Depression. The defendants attempt to
distinguish Jorgensen and Lyle on the basis that they arose under
separate constitutional provisions and implicated the separation of powers.
(Def. Br. at 39-40.) The municipal judges in Lyle based their claims
upon a provision of the 1870 Constitution that protected the salaries of
municipal officers, not the Judicial Article. See 360 Ill. at 27-29 (the
relators, municipal judges, were ‘municipal officers’). Thus, Lyle did
not rest upon separation of powers principles. This fact also defeats the defendants'
argument that Lyle drew a distinction between contract rights and
judicial salaries. (Def. Br. at 39-40.)
“Jorgensen did raise
important concerns about the separation of powers, but the defendants' attempt
to distinguish that case cuts too thin. Jorgensen was based on the
‘clear and unconditional’ terms of Article VI, § 14 of the Constitution (see
211 Ill. 2d at 305), which, like the Pension Protection Clause, guarantees that
certain compensation shall not be ‘diminished.’
“Jorgensen therefore is
instructive here. Lyle and Northrup likewise were based upon
‘plain and unequivocal’ constitutional provisions that ‘contained nothing that
expressly or impliedly authorized deviation from their terms . . . .’
Jorgensen, 211 111. 2d at 304 (discussing Lyle); Northrup, 308 Ill.
App. at 289 (basing its holding on the fact that ‘[t]here are no words’ in the
applicable constitutional guarantee of compensation ‘which make any reference,
either directly or by implication, to the subject of an emergency’). Those
cases support the plaintiffs' reliance here upon the equally plain and
unequivocal language of the Pension Protection Clause.
“The defendants also invoke the
adage that the Constitution is not a suicide pact. (Def. Br. at 43.) Setting
aside whether such hyperbolic rhetoric is even appropriate under the
circumstances presented here, this Court has consistently enforced the Illinois
Constitution despite arguments premised on dire fiscal conditions. Even in the
midst of the Civil War, this Court rejected the argument that adherence to a
State constitutional provision would leave the State with ‘no adequate
provision remaining to meet the ordinary expenses of the State government.’ People
ex rel. Merchants' Say., Loan & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Auditor of Pub.
Accounts, 30 Ill. 434, 445 (1863).
“This [Supreme] Court replied that the General Assembly was ‘clothed with
ample powers to provide for all financial difficulties.’ Id. No
financial difficulties, the Court explained, could justify violating the
Constitution. Id. at 444. Rather, our ‘safety, in the midst of perils,
is in a strict observance of the constitution—this is the bulwark to shield us
from aggressions.’ Id…”
from Brief of ISEA RSEA Heaton and Harrison
Plaintiffs-Appellees
No comments:
Post a Comment